Religiosity and Individual-Level Corruption: Experimental Evidence from Kenya
dc.contributor.author | Waithima, Abraham K. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-10T13:05:58Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-06-10T13:05:58Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper seeks to determine if people’s religious affiliation matters in their propensity to act corruptly. Using a three-person one-shot sequential move corruption game, this paper finds that people internalize their religious beliefs to affect outcomes including acting corruptly. Consistent with findings by Flavin and Ledet (2010), this paper find Catholics to have a higher propensity to offer and accept bribes and be less likely to punish corruption culprits than protestants and muslims. This paper concludes that people’s religious affiliation matters in the fight against corruption | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Waithima, A. (2012) Religiosity and individual-level corruption: European Scientific Journal. 8(20) pp. 62-80 http://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/issue/view/40 Working paper | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1857- 7431 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repository.daystar.ac.ke/handle/123456789/3564 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | European Scientific Journal | en_US |
dc.subject | Religiosity | en_US |
dc.subject | Religiosity | en_US |
dc.subject | Corruption | en_US |
dc.subject | Corruption | en_US |
dc.subject | Game theory | en_US |
dc.subject | Game theory | en_US |
dc.subject | Experiment | en_US |
dc.subject | Experiment | en_US |
dc.title | Religiosity and Individual-Level Corruption: Experimental Evidence from Kenya | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
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