Political Accountability and Governance in Kenya; Striking A Balance Between Party Loyalty over Constituents' Interests

Abstract

The study explores into the delicate balance between party loyalty and the representation of the interests of the constituents within the scope of the Kenyan political landscape. The dissertation delves into the evolution of political parties in Kenya historically, by examining how political party loyalty has been influencing decision-making among the elected officials. Through an analysis of the dynamics between the two, the study highlights the tension that arises when the two are to be effectuated. The principal accountability concept and the principal-agent problem concept are utilized as the theoretical framework to advance the extent to which loyalty to a party may advance or hinder political accountability and good governance in Kenya. The study further finds that whereas political party loyalty can promote political stability and unity, often, it comes at the expense of effective representation of the constituents, a situation which results in public distrust and to an extent, political unrest. The case study of the Finance Bill 2024 is a classical demonstration of how over allegiance to political party loyalty has its implications. The dissertation concludes with recommendations for balancing these competing demands to enhance good governance and accountability in Kenya's political system.